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THE ECONOMICS OF SHADOW PRICING:




1. The Function of Shadow Pricing
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economics--how the commodities used and produced by
should be valued in choosing among alternative modes
These valuations, however arrived at, have come to be
referred to as shadow prices. We review
valuations present a problem, and second
first the reasons why these
the various approaches that have
been taken in the literature for obtaining them. Section 1 defines the
role of shadow pricing, as the term is used here--a more general role
than is normally attributed to it--and catalogues the various sources of
market distortions. Shadow prices can potentially serve as substitutes
for distorted market prices in some cases, but not in others. Section 2
provides a critical review of the various approaches to shadow pricing that
have been advocated in the literature. Most are found either to be wanting
in their theoretical foundations or to be internally inconsistent.
*This paper owes a heavy debt to the author’s former teacher,
and to the comments and suggestions of Martin E. Abel, Walter




and any errors1.2. The Role of Shadow Prices
The economic evaluation of a proposed course of action (henceforth
“project”) involves three distinct operations: (a) determination of the
physical characteristics of the project, (b) translation of these
physical quantities into value terms, and (c) application of a decision-
making criterion. This paper is concerned with step (b). Step (a) is
the most difficult and crucial in practice, and most of the serious
errors in benefit-cost analysis probably occur at this stage. Neverthe-
less these problems are ignored in the present paper, and the information
required for step (a) is assumed to .be known. Until now step (c) has
received the most attention from economists. The criteria that have
been proposed include the choice of that project with:
- the highest net present value,
- the highest internal rate of return,
- the lowest domestic resource cost of foreign exchange,
- the highest ratio of discounted benefits to discounted costs.
The choice of criterion is an important, but perhaps not overwhelmingly
important, matter. It is assumed in this paper that the net present
value criterion has been adopted. The problem of valuation is common
to them all, however, and the ultimate choice of projects is typically
a good deal more sensitive to the way the valuation problem is handled
than to the particular choice of investment criterion.
The most obvious
all inputs and outputs of
and indeed this procedure
solution to the valuation problem is to value
the project at their domestic market prices,
is not lacking in advocates. Yet there are3
good reasons for thinking that market prices frequently do not adequately
reflect social valuations, especially in less-developed economies. Of
course, it is possible to argue that if market prices are badly distorted
the appropriate policy response is to attempt to eliminate these distortions.
This is certainly correct, but the project evaluator is ordinarily unable
to ensure that these reforms will be adopted. He may well express his
professional judgment on how market distortions should be removed, or
at least reduced; but having done so he must then assume, for the purposes
of project evaluation, either that these distortions will indeed be
eliminated or that they will persist. Frequently, the realistic assumption
is the latter, and this is the basis for the recent interest in accounting
or shadow prices for benefit-cost analysis.
Prices, as the term is used in economics, have two properties.
Firstly they describe the rates at which commodities can be exchanged
in a market, and secondly they are signals that decision-makers use in
deciding which course of action to pursue. Shadow prices have the second
characteristic but not necessarily the first. Shadow prices for use in
planning and evaluating public projects are intended to serve as the
basis for decisions on the design, adoption, and ultimate operation of
these projects, even though they are not necessarily the prices the
government actually pays or receives for inputs used or outputs produced.
The economic framework assumed in this paper is that of a mixed
economy in which the size of the public sector is exogenously given, and
market prices are distorted to varying degrees. Insofar as they differ
from market. prices, the shadow prices used in the public sector are4
to be used only in
ignored by private
entirely on market
the public sector. Not only are these
sector decision-makers, who base their
prices, but the determination of these
no effect on makket prices themselves via the government’s
policies.






said to be of minor practical importance in less-developed economies.
So few projects are designed and reach the “evaluation stage”, it is
pointed out, that few alternatives are actually rejected. This view
is certainly not without.merit, but it rests on the assumption that the
role of shadow pricing begins with the evaluation of a number of fully-
designed mutually exclusive alternatives (one of which is doing nothing)
and ends with the acceptance of one of them, This paper takes exception
to that assumption. The three operations of (a) project design,
(b) economic evaluation, and (c) operation of the adopted project, are
typically thought of as being independent and discrete activities. This
is reinforced by the fact that three entirely different groups -- engineers,
economists, and managers -- are normally responsible for these operations.
Logically, however, precisely the same kinds of decisions are
being made at all three stages.
possibilities are being selected
projects also involves selection
In project design some technical
and others rejected. The operation of
of some technically possible modes
of operation and the rejection of others; seldom is the project’s
technology so rigid that no ex-post substitution possibilities exist,
The economic principles that are relevant to the design and operation of
projects are thus exactly the same as those normally thought of as
being involved in the more formal stage of project evaluation. It is5
thus highly desirable that the same shadow prices as are to be used in
project evaluation be given to the engineers involved in designing
projects and the managers involved in operating projects, and that (at
a minimum) they be instructed to keep those prices in mind in carrying
out their functions. This is not commonly done in practice,
1.3. Market Distortions a;d Their Implications
One of the most characteristic features of a less-developed
economy is that markets are not well developed and that market prices
are distorted. These distortions are due in part to the failure of
the markets themselves to function efficiently, and in part to the
effects of government policy. Their implications are that market prices
are potentially misleading indicators of social valuations. The sources
of these distortions include the following:
(a) Non-competitive behavior. This includes any reason why
decision-makers do not take prices as given such as monopoly, oligopoly,
etc.
(b) Production non-convexities. In general this implies that
a competitive equilibrium does not exist. If market failure occurs for
this reason shadow prices will normally fail to achieve an optimal
solution for exactly the same reason.
(c) Externalities. This includes cases where markets do not
exist for things which affect individuals’ welfare. The extreme case
is that of a pure public good. For example, the emphasis on the importance6
of sub-optimal savings in recent years has rested largely on the analogy
between savings and a public good in the Samuelsonian sense.
1
(d) Informational failure. Markets may fail to operate efficiently
because individuals do not know all the alternatives that are in fact
open to them.
(e) Income distribution. It is not hard to see that the distri-
bution of income affects market prices. If that distribution is judged
to be non-optimal then the market prices which arise from it may also be
judged non-optimal, even if perfectly competitive.
(f) Effects of government policy. The following market-distorting
policies are extremely common in less-developed economies:
over-valued domestic currency,
tariffs and import quotas,
interest rate ceilings,
rental ceilings on land,
wage rate floors,
- domestic tax-~w-subsidy policies,
commodity price supports.
Reforms required to stimulate development such as the provision of
necessary public and semi-public goods (including roads, marketing
facilities, education, research on local production problems, etc.) take
time to yield a visi’ble return and are often unpopular with the most
powerful groups. For similar reasons reforms required for a more equit-
able distribution of assets are politically difficult to achieve. All
too often it is politically expedient to attempt to defuse political
pressures for genuine reforms by imposing distortions on the price
1
However, this is not the only basis for a belief that savings are
typically sub-optimal, especially in less-developed economies. For
a brief summary of several strong arguments see Sen (1972), and for
a detailed analysis of the public goods argument see Sen (1967).7
system. The ultimate beneficiaries, however, tend not to be the poor~
but those who can best manipulate the bureaucracies to their own advantage.
If we catalogue the kinds of market configurations that may arise
as consisting of:
(a) those in which prices work in principle and market prices
are not distorted,
(b) those in which prices do not work in principle, due to the
existence of, say, production non-convexities, and
(c) those in which prices work in principle but market prices
are distorted,
then this paper is concerned only with case (c). Case (a) is not of
interest here since there is no reason not to rely on private markets in
this case. Case (b) is not of interest because non-convexities generate
the same kinds of problems for shadow pricing as they do for the operation
of competitive markets. Furthermore we are concerned only with that
subset of distortions of the case (c) variety where the project evaluator
cannot ensure that the policy changes necessary to correct the distortion
will be carried out.
A distortion of the case (c) kind is depicted in Figure 1. Aggregate
production and consumption possibilities for the two commodities 1 and 2
are described by the convex set Z (vertical lines). Suppose that both
the public and private sectors are involved in the production of these
commodities and that the two sectors are basing their production decisions
on the same distorted market prices. Since all producers in the economy
are using the same prices, production efficiency is attained and theeconomy will be producing on the boundary of Z, at say point A. However,




Figure 1: Implications of a market distortion
in production at A is not equal to the social marginal rate of sub-
stitution in consumption at A. The latter is given by the slope of the
o
social indifference curve W at A.
Optimality is achieved at B, where all producers set their
**
marginal rates of transformation equal to the slope of W at the point
of tangency with Z. Yet if private producers cannot be induced to do
this, point B is unattainable. If the public sector uses different
prices from those used in the private sector, we know that some production
efficiency must be sacrificed. The economy will. then be producing in
the interior of Z, denoted I(Z). Representing the upper preference
sets of WO as W$
as to whether we can
sector such that the
(diagonal lines in Fig. 1), then the question arises
find a set of shadow prices for use in the public
economy will be producing and consuming in the open
set given by the intersection of I(Z) with W; (cross-hatched in Fig. 1).
If so, then use of these shadow prices is a good thing; it increases
welfare. On the other hand, if the use of shadow prices causes the9
economy to locate in the intersection of I(Z) with W:
o
, where W
denotes the lower preference sets of WO, then their use is undesirable.2. Approaches to Shadow Pricing
2.1. Introduction
Numerous approaches to the calculation of welfare-increasing
shadow prices have been proposed, but the economic literature on the
subject is, in general, quite confused. The underlying assumptions
made by different authors about the objectives of shadow pricing, the
areas in which shadow prices are to be used, and the conditions that
hold in the remainder of the economy, are frequently inconsistent.
Worse still, these assumptions are seldom spelled out in detail. The
reader is forced to try to infer the economic models that different
authors have in mind from the way they attempt to defend their particular
1/
approaches .— In part this is due to the practical orientation of the
majority of the literature on shadow pricing. It is assumed that
readers are mainly interested in being told “how to do it”, and would
simply be turned off by abstract theorizing. Such studies certainly
have a role to play, but unless the underlying assumptions of the
various approaches are made explicit, the basic areas of dispute are
not likely to be clarified.
One issue is of critical importance. The existence of non-
optimalities in the operation of markets in the private sector is
almost invariably the justification for considering the inclusion of
a particular investment in the public sector. It is also the reason
‘Regarding the usage of the term “shadow price”, Rudra has written,
somewhat sarcastically: “It has become a commonplace notion which
everybody, even journalists, seem to understand. One encounters the
phrase “shadow price” in every nook and corner of economic policy
discussions without any reference to any particular feasibility
constraints or any particular objective function. ” Rudra (1972, p. 13).
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for our interest in shadow pricing. These non-opt imalities may derive
from the nature of the markets themselves, the effects of government
policy, or both. To evaluate the investment it is necessary to make
assumptions about what will happen to those distortions if the invest-
ment is undertaken, For example, suppose the domestic production of
rice is protected by a prohibitive tariff. Rice would be imported if
it were not for the tariff, but with the tariff no trade in rice occurs
at all. Suppose a public sector investment is being considered which
would use rice as an input. To evaluate it, we must assume either
that rice will continue to be non-traded after the investment is made,
or that the investment will cause rice to be traded, because, say, it
2/
induces a reduction in the tariff,—
In particular circumstances, either assumption may be appropriate --
but it is particularly important which assumption is made. Much of the
confusion in the shadow pricing literature stems from the differing
assumptions that are made about exactly this issue. In this study it
is assumed that project evaluators have control only over the shadow
prices used :inthe public sector, and hence the public projects that
are undertaken, and that distortions in the private sec~or .I~.v.. . . . . ,;
taken as given. Any non-optimalities in the economy outside the control
of the project evaluator concerned -- that is, outside the set of public
projects he is evaluating -- have to be considered as constraints on
his planning exercise. In the case of the above example, we assume
that undertaking the investment would not cause the tariff to be reduced
and the good to be imported.
2
For a discussion of this and related cases, see Sen (1972).12
2.2. Arbitrary Adjustment of Market prices
The approach to shadow pricing most commonly used in practice
is that of arbitrarily adjusting market prices in a direction that
seems appropriate. For example, if the market wage is thought to be
“too high”j the shadow price of labor might be set at half the market
wage, or even zero. Examples of exactly this procedure are frequently
encountered in the benefit-cost analyses conducted by international
aid and lending agencies, as well as by national anclregional planning
agencies. Clearly, this procedure is open to attack. There is little
basis for a belief that arbitrary adjustments of market prices will
increase welfare, even if the appropriate direction of adjustment is
known.
Suppose, for simplicity, that the relationship between social
welfare and the shadow price of, say, labor takes the strictly concave,
single-peaked form described in Figure 2. Social welfare is maximized
* by a shadow price of labor equal to s*. at W The market wage, so,
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Figure 2: Arbitrary adjustment of market prices13
perceive that s* < so, but have no way of estimating the magnitude of
the difference, they might set the shadow price at sO/2. But this
00
implies a further reduction of social welfare to W . Obviously,
the diagram need not have been drawn in precisely this way. Neverthe-
less, it is clear that, unless project planners are equipped with a
procedure for estimating the quantitative divergence between market
prices and optimal shadow prices, there is no theoretical basis for
a presumption that the adjustment of market prices in “an appropriate
direction” will increase welfare. It is of course true that “small”
adjustments are the most likely to increase welfare; but small changes
producesmall improvements and “small” improvements may not be of
interest.
2.3. The Equilibrium Approach
Non-optimal government policies are frequently the main source
of market distortions. It is tempting, therefore, to attach normative
significance to the price that would hold if these price-distorting
policies were discontinued. For example, if minimum wage laws are
the source of a distortion in the labor market, usury laws are the
source of a distortion in the capital market, or official
of the domestic currency is the source of a distortion in




of the “equilibrium price” that would
distorting policy. Advocates of this
and, in the case of foreign exchange,
result from suspension of the
procedure include Tinbergen (1958)
Bacha and Taylor (1971).There are serious conceptual difficulties with this approach.
Firstly, the procedure is applied only when the “distortion” is due to
the existence of non-optimal government policies. If the distortion
arises from, say, the non-competitive behavior of economic agents, the
existence of externalities, informational failures, or income distribu-
tional reasons, it is the absence of first-best corrective policies
(assuming that such policies exist in principle) that is the essence of
the problem. It therefore seems arbitrary and inconsistent to define
the optimal shadow price to be the equilibrium price that results
when government policy is “optimal” in the limited sense above. Policy
is assumed to be optimal in the sense that non-optimal interventions
currently being practiced are discontinued, but not optimal in the
sense that optimal interventions not currently being practiced are
in fact instituted. There appears to be no theoretical justification
for assuming optimality in the first sense and not in the second.
Secondly, the procedure is applied piecemeal, with the distortions
in the various markets analysed separately. ~!Theequilibrium price” ‘n
the labor market, “the equilibrium price” in the capital market, and
IItheequilibrium price IIin the foreign exchange
analysed independently in a partial equilibrium
that the distorting policy is removed. However
can logically be separated from the others, and
market, are each
framework which assumes
none of these markets
if each market is
analysed on the assumption that all the others continue to behave in
their present distorted manner the results will be meaningless; each
IIequilibrium Price” will be based on assumptions inconsistent with
those underlying every other “equilibrium price”. There is no logical15
alternative to a general equilibrium treatment. Furthermore, there is
no logical reason for separating the analysis of the various markets
involved from the distribution of income. If the government can “in
principle” pursue an optimal policy with respect to, say, the foreign
exchange market, why can it not also “in principle” effect an optimal
distribution of income? Since the demand for foreign exchange clearly
depends on the distribution of income, it is inconsistent to analyse
the foreign exchange market without also inquiring into the implications
of optimizing the distribution of income. This applies equally to the
other markets mentioned above and, unless the income distribution is
thought to be optimal already, failure to consider this could be a
serious deficiency.
Thirdly, it is taken for granted by the advocates of this approach
that “the equilibrium price”, appropriately defined, is what should
guide production decisions in the public sector. Assuming that the
above problems have been appropriately handled, this is the price that
would hold in a particular market if optimal policies were pursued.
However, either these policies will in fact be pursued during the life ——
of the proposed public investment, or they will not. If the project
evaluator believes that they will, the task of shadow pricing reduces
to one of predicting the market prices that will result. If he believes
they will not, and this appears to be the more relevant case, it seems
rather foolish for him to assume otherwise. If present market distortions
are expected to continue, it seems odd indeed to recommend that the
government’s investment policy be based on the assumption that the
economyis at a full-employment, first-best, optimum. In this case the16
relevant question is not ‘What would equilibrium prices be in Utopia?”,
but “How can resources best be allocated in the public sector ~iven
those distortions that cannot, for the time being, be removed?” There
is no reason why the answers to these questions should be the same.
Thus, even leaving aside the empirical problems of estimating “equilibrium
prif.esfl>/ it is clear that this approach is not satisfactory.Y
2.4. The Programming Approach
In principle, programming models can be used to overcome all of
the difficulties raised above. In practice, however, the very problems
that cause us to be interested in shadow pricing in the first instance
also create serious problems for computable programming models, Firstly,
the market distortions listed in Section 2.2 above are extremely difficult
to model in a computable program. For the reasons presented above, we
are interested here in optimizing only within the public sector; economy-
wide programming solutions are clearly irrelevant.ti’ But the distortions
3Tinbergen defines the “intrinsic valuel’ or “accounting pr-cell of
labor, capital
!
or foreign exchange to be that price “that would
prevail if (i the investment pattern under discussion were actually
carried out, and (ii) equilibrium existed on the markets just mentioned.’!
Tinbergen (1958,p. 39).
4In practice the empirical problems will frequently be severe, and the
approach will often be more or less comparable to the arbitrary
adjustment of market prices considered above. Thus Tinbergen writes:
“It may be quite sufficient to make a rough guess as to the consequences
of the ... fundamental disequilibrium. ” Tinbergen (1958, p. 41).
5For a statement of the desirability of using economy-wide programming
models to compute shadow prices for project evaluation, see Chenery
(1964). Examples of empirical studies include Adelman (1966),
Tendulkar (1971), and Weisskopf (1971). Most studies use economy-
wide optimization models, and ignore market distortions. The results
are of little relevance to the problems considered here.17
in the private sector cannot be ignored since they are the source of
our interest in shadow prices. They must be incorporated into the
model as constraints. However, the Junctional relationships involved
are virtually all non-linear, and this raises severe computational
problems. Non-linear programming models can be computed, but only when
they have a small number of variables and constraints. This necessitates
a high level of aggregation -- so high, in fact, that the results are
of little practical interest. Piece-wise linear models can be constructed,
but since they increase the size of the program substantially, their
use has, in practice, to be limited to those relationships that are
thought to be most important.
Secondly, there is something unscientific about the way com-
putable programs must be constructed in practice. After gathering the
inadequate information that is available and “debugging” the model, the
programmer will make a trial run. Almost invariably, this produces
an absurd solution. Suppose that all nitrogenous fertilizer (N) and
all phosphatic fertilizer (P) used in the economy is produced domestically
in the public sector. Then the dual solution to this initial run might
indicate that the shadow price of N is $1 per ton and that of P is
$100 per ton. This is unrealistic, and something has to be done about
it. But there are many things that could be done: the production
function of N could be made piece-wise linear, so that less could be
produced from, saY9 a given amount Of electrical energy; some of the
constraints on the supply of imputs into P production could be relaxed,
so that more P could be produced; the amount of rice produced from an
additional ton of N could be increased; and so on. It is somewhat18
arbitrary how these problems are corrected, and it is unclear in the
end whether the shadow prices obtained reflect social scarcities at the
optimal solution, or merely the particular adjustments that, given his
inadequate data base, the programmer has chosen to make to the model.
Thirdly, and this is partly the reason for the second problem,
the basic functional relationships involved simply are not known. Most
importantly, the production functions in the public sector are not
known by any one agency. This is the essence of the motivation for
decentralized planning. Project planners may “know” the characteristics
of the various alternative projects at their disposal in the sense that,
given a set of relative prices, they could determine the profit-maximizing
set of projects to adopt, and how best to operate them; but they may not
“know” them in the sense that they could list the functional relationships
involved, and convey this to the central planners. Even if they could?
however~ the cost of collecting and processing this information would
be huge.
The programming approach to shadow pricing for the public sector
would appear to be well worth pursuing as a research topic; but at
present the problems of applying it meaningfully to actual planning
situations seem to be prohibitive.
2.5 Decentralized Planning Theory
The theory of decentralized planning has been developed in
response to the obvious fact that no one agency in the economy has
all the information necessary to plan for the entire economy, or even
the entire public sector. Central planners may know the government’s19
objective function and a good deal about the overall structure of the
economy, but the production possibilities of individual projects are
known only to the individual project managers. The problem of
decentralized planning, then, is to find an efficient way of exchanging
information between central planners and project managers so that an
optimal plan is achieved, or at least acceptably approximated. As yet
the theory is not well developed, and it does not seem likely that any
country will institute a program of decentralized planning based on
this literature in the immediate future. The theory is particularly
weak in the quality of the convergence properties that have so far
been demonstrated for the various iterative procedures proposed in
the literature. Little is known about rates of convergence toward
optimal solutions after a finite number of iterations, or about the
number of iterations necessary to approximate the optimal solution
within a specified neighborhood.
6/
The best known iterative procedur-is initiated by central
planners sending a vector of prices to project managers. The project
managers compute their optimal production programs at those prices
and send this information back to the central planners.
duction programs for the various projects are then used
a new vector of prices co send to project managers, and
6





the direction of signals discussed here is’r~ve~sed, see Marglin
(1969) and Weitzman (19’70). A less technical presentation and an
extensive bibliography can be found in Hurwicz (1975). See also
Heal (1973).20
continues until an acceptable and feasible production plan for the
economy (or public sector) is attained. The plan is then implemented
by means of a final price vector which project managers are instructed
to act upon.
While the theory of decentralized planning appears to be a
potentially fruitful research area, it has yet to produce much of
practical usefulness, Nevertheless, it provides a helpful perspective
for the theory of shadow pricing. Shadow pricing truncates the above
process at the end of the first step. In decentralized planning
procedures, no economic decisions are actually made until numerous




information about production possibilities at the
But this exchange of information does not occur in the
~~ Since actual economic pricing, as discussed here.
decisions are based on the initial price vector in the above schema,
these prices must be set without detailed information about the pro-
duction possibility sets of individual projects. Clearly, if the
optimal shadow price vector is highly sensitive to this information,
shadow pricing is in deep trouble.
However, this may not be the case. For example, if a country
produced and consumed only commodities which were traded on perfectly
competitive international markets> the dual solution to any production-
70f course, as experience of the results of using shadow pricing over
time accumulates, feedback of information on production possibility
sets can occur. This information may indeed by very useful, but it
is slow to accumulate, and little information of this kind is available
when a program of shadow pricing is first instituted.21
consumption program would be the international prices. The dual solution
is completely insensitive to the details of the production functions
involved, or to the form of the social welfare function. However, the
details of the optimal production program depend heavily on the form
of the production functions involved. It is sometimes claimed that if
the optimal set of shadow prices (dual solution) is known by planners,
the optimal production plan for the various projects (primal solution)
must be known by them also. If central planners do not have sufficient
information to compute the optimal production program~ it is claimed,
8/
they could not know the optimal set of shadow prices either.— But
this is false. It is logically possible to be in total ignorance
about one, while being completely informed about the other.
“Nevertheless, since there always exist non-traded commodities,
the matter is less straightforward than this. As Sen has put it:
It is certainly not an all-or-none question, and
much depends on the relative sensitivity of optimal
quantities and associated prices. If prices respond
a little and the quantities a grea~ deal to some
variable, the exact value of which the central
planners do not know and which the firms know
precisely, tl~estage-wise procedure of choosing
irst and quantities later may make much
%::&
As an instrument of planning, shadow pricing has the very
economical characteristic that a single set of prices is sent to
8
—
For example of attacks on shadow pricing based on the assumption of a
one-to-one correspondence between primal and dual solutions see
Rudra (1972) and Weckstein (1972). For a further discussion of this
set of issues see Sen (1970).
9Sen (1970, p. ‘71).22
project managers for use in determining the projects’ optimal production
plans, but that these prices are set without detailed foreknowledge
of exactly what those production plans will be. Yet, to the extent
that the valuations implicit in these shadow prices are themselves
altered by the production decisions made by projects, this procedure
will lead to errors. It is, of course, precisely this simultaneous
relationship between valuations (shadow prices) and production decisions
that the iterative procedures of decentralized planning theory attempt
to cope with. This problem is relevant to all approaches to shadow
pricing, including the use of market prices, and we will have, occasion
to return to it in later sections.
2,6 The Melfare Accounting Approach
A substantial literature has developed ia recent years on the
application of an approach, the basic proposition of which is that the
shadow price of an input into a public project should be set at the
cost in social welfare (in terms of some convenient numeraire) of
using it, while the shadow price of an output should be set at the gain
in social welfare of producing it.N This proposition has obvious
intuitive appeal -- so obvious, in fact, that its advocates have not
thought it necessary to demonstrate its validity, or precise meaning,
10
The two most influential studies to date are Little and Mirrlees
(1969) and Dasgupta, Marglin and Sen (1972). The former is not
well written, and clearer sources of Little and Mirrlees’ views are
Little and Mirrlees (19’72)and (1974).23
within a formal economic model. The outcome of this LS that it has
been unclear how the welfare accounting approach
theory, and whether the existence of distortions
is adequately taken account of by this approach.
are serious anomalies and inconsistencies in the
relates to optimization
in the private sector
Furthermore, there
way that Little and
Mirrlees (1969), the best known of the studies advocating the welfare
accounting approach, recommends that the approach be applied. The
assumptions underlying Little and Mirrlees ’ specific recommendations are
not always made explicit, and their economic analysis seems arbitrary
and ad hoc.
Little and Mirrlees divide commodities into what we will call
11/
“tradeables” and “non-t radeables”,- The former includes all commodities
that would be traded if the government pursued an optimal trade policy
and thus may include many ~ommodities not currently traded. In the
case of our above example, where rice is subject to a prohibitive
tariff, Little and Mirrlees would consider rice to be a “traceable”.
Tradeables are to be valued at their international prices, since these
12/
“measure reasonably well their true social costs and benefits”.-
Lictle and Mirrlees “advise that evaluators should lean over backwards’w
to deem commodities to belong to the “tradeables” category. The
criterion that the good would be traded if trade policy were optimal
i.sexplained as follows:
11
Little and Mirrlees use the terms “traded goods” and “non-traded
goods”. The terms “tradeables” and “non-tradeables” are used above
to draw attention to the peculiar meaning that Little and Mirrlees
attach to these categories and to distinguish this from the usage
of the terms “traded” and “non-traded” adopted here.
12Little and Mirrlees (197’2, p. 260).
13
ibid., P. 263.24
“Somtimes, our guess about whether a commodity will
be imported or not may be almost a value judgment:
we think that a sensible government would plan to
import some, so we assume that it will do so. Of
course, if one of our assumptions required government
action in order to be fulfilled, this should be dra
T to the attention of the appropriate authorities”.~
This reflects an optimistic faith in the ability and willingness
of governments to do what Little and Mirrlees think is sensible;~f but
it is not a faith that Little and Mirrlees apply consistently. The
entire structure of domestic prices is assumed by them to remain
distorted, so that domestic prices should be used as shadow prices only
as a last resort. Yet, if the government can pursue an optimal trade
policy, why can it not pursue an optimal domestic policy as well? If
this approach were applied consistently all market distortions would
have to be assumed away, and the welfare accounting approach would
reduce to the utopian form of the equilibrium approach discussed above.
This is evidently not what Little and Mirrlees wish to do.
The relevant issue is clearly whether public production or
use of a commodity will, or will not, affect trade, given the project
evaluator’s expectations about future trade policy -- not whether it
would affect trade if trade policy were optimal. In this study we
assume, for simplicity, that distorting policies not subject to the
control of the project evaluator concerned will persist; though, of
14
Little and Mirrlees (1969, p, 1.06).
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Elsewherey however, Little and Mirrlees state that: “In reality, we
do not expect governments to adopt ideal policies...”, Little and
Mirrlees (19”/2, p. 263).25
course, this is not necessary. Commodities, the use or production of
which in the public sector will affect trade, will henceforth be
referred to as “traded” and all other commodities will be called
“non-traded”.
Little and Mirrlees ’ recommendation that traded commodities be
valued at international prices implies that tariffs should be ignored.
The rationale for this does not depend on the assumption that trade
policy will suddenly become optimal. This is illustrated, in a partial
equilibrium framework, in Figure 3. ‘lsl
is the domestic supply
schedule for the commodity and ‘lDl
is the domestic demand schedule,
before the proposed public investment is made. The international
price for the commodity is r, and a tariff is applied at the rate ~.
The domestic price is then r(l+t), since the good is still imported



















Figure 3: Effects of a non-prohibitive tariff26
the demand schedule shifts to D2D2, and
q2-qo. The increase in tariff revenues,
shaded area. Yet this is at most a mere
imports rise from ql-qO to
@ - Q, is given by the
intra-governmental transfer
of funds -- from, say, the Treasury to the project to the import agent
to the Customs Department, and perhaps back to the Treasury. It has
no welfare significance. The social cost of importing the good is r,
the international price.
This assumes, however, that the tariff was not so high as to
preclude any imports of the good at all, A situation where this is
so is depicted in Figure 4. The domestic price of the commodity before
the shift in the demand schedule is PI. Shifting the demand curve
‘0 ‘2D2
causes a rise in the domestic price to P2 and a rise in
both domestic production and use of the cormnodity from q~ to q2.
Clearly, trade is unaffected by public use of the good and, by our
above definition, the good is non-traded. The international price is







Figure 4: Effects of a prohibitive tariff27
The case of an import quota is depicted in Figure 5, The domestic
supply schedule is still S1S19 but the effect of imposing an import
quota of size Q is to make the effective supply schedule the “kinked”
l-ine ‘1s2”
Since the quota is
the demand schedule, public use
to rise and domestic production
already binding before the shift in
of the good causes the domestic price
and use to rise as in Figure 4. Again,
however, trade is unaffected, so from the standpoint of the above
definition the good is “non-traded”, and the international price is not
relevant to its valuation.H ~fcour~e, if the quota is not binding
before or after the shift in the demand schedule, it has no effect,
and public use affects trade directly as in Figure 3. The international
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Figure 5; Effects of a binding impor~ quota
tity
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Little and Mirrlees (1969, pp. 92-3) are equivocal on the valuation
of commodities subject to import quotas. They seem to recommend
ignoring the quota, whether it is binding or not, and valuing the
good at its international price,28
As to the valuation of “non-t radeables”, Little and Mirrlees
recommend the following:
“Our normal method of valuing such items is to
break them down into their inputs with similar
iterative treatment of non-traded inputs, until
one is left only with traded goods
d
nd labour or
land (including minerals, etc.)”.l
The tradeables are then valued at their international prices, but
special methods are recommended for the valuation of labor. Little
and Mirrlees’ “shadow wage rate” emphasises the effect that hiring
additional workers has on the total amount of savings available for
investment. If the rate of savings is suboptimal, and hiring an
extra worker transfers resources out of savings and into consumption,
then it seems appropriate to take account of this in assessing the
18/
social cost of hiring the worker.— Since Little and Mirrlees are
concerned mainly with evaluating industrial projects, they give little
attention to the valuation of land, and assume it to be an unimportant
input.
To achieve this breakdown, however, some rate of transformation
between “non-tradeables” and their inputs must be assumed. Little
and Mirrlees clearly intend that the currently observable rates of
transformation should be used. This is equivalent to a procedure
recommended more recently by Dasgupta and Stiglitz (197.4). It can~~ be
1
7Little and Mirrlees (1972, p. 262).
18
The author has attempted, in Warr (19’73), to show the relationship
between Little and Mirrlees ’ shadow wage rate and optimization theory~
and to draw attention to some particular biases in the Little-Mirrlees
formula that this exercise reveals, See also Sen (1972).
19
See Warr (1974), Chapter 3.29
shown that this is incorrect. The correct rate of transformation to
use is the rate that would obtain when optimal shadow prices are used;
but since this rate cannot be determined without knowledge of the
optimal shadow prices, it cannot be an input into their calculation.
There is thus a fundamental logical error in the way Little and Mirrlees
approach the valuation of non-tradeables.
Ideally, however, the welfare accounting approach seems to aim
at producing a set of shadow prices whose adoption by all producers
in the economy would be socially desirable -- not just public projects.
This raises the questinn of whether these prices are still optimal if
applied only partially. Weckstein (1972) has recently criticized this
approach, and the programming approach, on these grounds
‘When a price rule is to be applied partially, the
objective should be to find prices that signal an
optima].accommodationto a given nonoptimal structure 20/
of prices and allocations -- a ‘second-best’ criterion. ’-’
Weckstein argues that while
“It is conceivable that an optimization procedure
where values not subject to policy control are
specified as parameters and constraints might
112 J/ yield such a second-best solution. .. —
nevertheless, this is not the way shadow prices are normally calculated.
He then concludes that:
“If that were the objective, local market prices
are probably a more efficient and far more
f122/ accessible source of such information. _




There are two logical flaws in this argument. Firstly,
Weckstein implicitly assumes that “first-best” and “second-best”
shadow prices are necessarily different. For example, he criticizes
Little and Mirrlees for recommending use of international prices for
traded goods in public projects, on the grounds that these are “optimal
prices” and are therefore “irrelevant to an economy that does not in
,,23/ fact achieve an optimal allocation of resources. — This might be
true if there was necessarily a one-to-one correspondence between dual
and primal solutions; but as it stands, this part of Weckstein’s claim
is unproven. Secondly, Weckstein’s assertion that “probably” local
market prices are the best second-best prices to use is not substantiated,
or even explained. Nevertheless, Weckstein’s objections are not entirely
without merit because it must be said that the advocates of the welfare




issue for public investment,
demonstrated that this approach satisfies
that Weckstein raises.
Conclusions
appropriate shadow prices is an important
especially in economies where market prices
are thought to be badly distorted. Shadow prices have relevance not
only for project evaluation (benefit-cost analysis), but also for the
design of projects and their eventual management as well. Nevertheless
there still remain serious unresolved theoretical (not to mention prac-
tical) problems concerning the calculation of welfare-increasing shadow
prices. (i) Little has been done on the incorporation of income
23
ibid., p. 479.31
distributional objectives into benefit-cost analysis. (ii) The valua-
tion problems implied by the non-existence of markets (e.g., the
existence of “externalities” and “public goods”) have largely been ignored
23’ (iii) The fact that shadow prices in the shadow pricing literature.—
are to be applied only partially implies the potential existence of
serious “second-best” problems which have been similarly ignored in the
24/
shadow pricing literature.—
It is important to note that the existence of the above defects
in the present techniques for calculating shadow prices do not necessarily
imply that the use of distorted domestic market prices is superior to the
use of imperfect shadow prices. For example, if the “second-best” problems
raised here are presumed to be serious, this implies that we can no longer
be certain that the use of “first-best” shadow prices is superior to the
use of distorted domestic market prices; but this in itself is not an
argument for the use of distorted domestic market prices. The important
issue is the quality of approximation involved in each case. What we wish
to know is which procedure will, in general, get us to the highest level
of social welfare in yractice. Future research may help to illuminate —
this issue. Perhaps the analysis of a numerically computable nonlinear
programming model, albeit small and overly simplified, would produce some
useful insights.
23
The one notable exception to this is the literature on the implications
of sub-optimal savings for the valuation of labor. See Sen (1972) and
Warr (1973).
24For a rigorous analysis of these issues see Warr (1974).REFERENCES
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